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Unemployment protection reforms in Southern European countries 




Efficiency and equity are the two core objectives of unemployment protection schemes. 
Substantial academic production has focused on theoretically discussing the adverse 
effects of unemployment benefits as well as their empirical validation. However, the 
evaluations made of unemployment protection reforms, implemented in every European 
country, have not as a rule been based on these two state intervention objectives. Hence, 
this constitutes the main purpose of this article. To this end, we subjected the reform 
measures undertaken in four southern European countries between 2004 and 2016 to 
analysis. Three different profiles were identified: the Italian reforms improved both 
efficiency and equity; Portugal and Spain returned an opposite profile while in Greece, 
an improvement in efficiency was counterbalanced by a negative impact on equity.  
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I. Introduction 
Several authors argue that efficiency constitutes the core objective of unemployment 
protection schemes (Snower 1995; Barr 2012; Pestieu 2013). There is general consensus 
around how asymmetric information in private markets causes two serious consequences: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Both serve to explain so-called incomplete markets 
in that neither all social risks nor all people receive private insurance coverage. 
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Furthermore, unemployment – as a social risk – has remained uninsurable in private 
markets (Barr 2012: 135).  
        The state acts in two complementary ways to solve the adverse selection and moral 
hazard issues: membership of public schemes should be mandatory (and therefore 
covering both low and high risks) and unemployment benefits are only to be granted in 
cases of involuntary unemployment.  
        Unemployment insurance (UI) - one of the two components of unemployment 
protection schemes – seeks to obtain the efficiency objective. UI is generally an earnings-
related benefit payable to unemployed people who meet a certain qualifying period, with 
limited durations and expenditure financed by social contributions paid in by employees 
and by employers (Stovicek and Turrini 2002; Esser et al. 2013). UI also contributes to 
the second unemployment protection scheme objective. Based on the risk sharing 
principle, this redistributes from employed people (who pay the social contributions) to 
unemployed people (who receive the benefits) (Barr 2012). However, unemployment 
assistance (UA) - the second component of unemployment protection schemes – 
represents the best instrument for preventing or alleviating unemployment-related 
poverty (Stovicek and Turrini 2002; Pestieu 2013). This is means-tested, granted in the 
form of flat-rate amounts and complements the UI after beneficiaries have exhausted their 
rights to benefit or alternatively provides economic support to unemployed persons who 
fail to meet the qualifying period required by UI (Salgado and Figari 2014). Based on the 
solidarity principle, this expenditure is financed by tax revenues.  
        Substantial academic work has focused on the adverse effects of unemployment 
benefits on labour markets. According to this theoretical body of research – job-search 
theory and efficiency-wage theory – generous unemployment protection, in terms of 




(Snower 1995; Jin and Lenain 2015). Unemployment protection “brings distortions in the 
choices of beneficiaries” (Pestieu 2013: 94) through three ways: i) unemployment 
benefits discourage searching for jobs whenever an unemployed person, on finding a job, 
loses the right to unemployment protection, the well-known `unemployment trap` 
(Snower 1995; Venn 2012; Stovicek and Turrini 2012 ); ii)  the benefits may contribute 
to increasing the duration of job searches, and thus also increasing the length of time spent 
unemployed (Snower 1995; Venn 2012); and iii) unemployment protection may raise the 
wage at which unemployed people accept a job, i.e. the reservation wage (Venn 2012; Jin 
and Lenain 2015). Despite these theoretical predictions, the actual empirical evidence is 
neither strong nor mixed (Spezia 2000; Barr 2012; Howell and Rehm 2009; OECD 2011; 
Elsby et al. 2008).  
        Comparisons between unemployment protection systems and the reforms enacted 
since 2000 in European Union member states have attracted the attention of many 
researchers (Arcanjo 2012; Turrini et al. 2015; Stănescu 2015; Stovicek and Turrini 2015; 
Ozkan 2014; Pfeifer 2010; Chung and Thewissen 2011). The studies diverge across their 
methodological options, that is, in terms of the number of countries studied, the time 
horizons, the choice of one or both components of the protection schemes and also in the 
parameters subject to analysis. However, no study has sought to relate system 
characteristics and/or their reforms to the objectives of state intervention. 
         The present article thus aims to analyse the reforms of unemployment protection 
schemes (insurance and assistance) for the period between 2004 and 2016 in Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The legislative changes 
concerning eligibility (the main conditions and qualifying periods) and generosity 
(replacement rates, reference earnings, flat-rate amounts, and the duration of payment). 




the reforms carried out in the four countries and, secondly, to relate them to their 
performance in terms of efficiency, equity and potential adverse effects. 
        The structure of the article is thus as follows. The following section presents a brief 
normative and positive discussion of the reform profile. Section 2 presents the main 
characteristics of the four systems in the base year (2004) before identifying the 
legislative changes introduced between 2005 and 2016 as well as the profile of the 
reforms in each country before section 3 sets out the conclusions.  
II. Efficiency and equity and the policy reform profiles 
According to Snower (1995), the objectives of efficiency and equity and the potential 
adverse effects provide the grounds for any evaluation of unemployment protection 
reforms. 
        The theoretical hypothesis relating to the generosity of unemployment schemes, 
mainly their high replacement rates and unlimited duration, lies at the heart of the 
potential effects on incentives to take up jobs. However, any empirical analysis crucially 
needs to distinguish between the two components of unemployment protection (UI and 
UA) and their most recent designs (Spezia 2000; Venn 2012). Firstly, access to UI 
benefits requires a certain qualifying period while for UA benefits economic need 
establishes the basic eligibility criteria; whenever unemployed people are eligible for one 
of these benefits, “on-going eligibility may depend on compliance with job-search-related 
requirements with sanctions for non-compliance” (Venn 2012:7). Secondly, the 
hypothesis of unlimited duration does not apply to any component. Furthermore, these 
criteria together contribute to reducing benefit dependence. Finally, this expect the 
unemployment trap is severely minimized in unemployment schemes with low income 




        Although the empirical evidence remains controversial, “governments in the wider 
EU have increasingly looked more holistically at the benefits structure to encourage 
labour force participation” (Barr 2012: 148). However, measures aimed at minimizing 
work disincentives should be weighed against their own negative impacts on the standards 
of living of all beneficiaries and, consequently, on worse job matching levels. According 
to Howell and Rehm (2009), the design of reforms does not always pay sufficient 
attention to this trade-off. Recognizing the importance of this double effect, Layard et al. 
(1991) propose that generous unemployment benefits (amounts) should be granted for 
limited periods.   
The design and reforms of unemployment protection are particularly relevant over 
the course of the business cycle. Empirical analysis of the experiences of European 
countries reveals some trends. Even through unemployment protection usually gets 
improved (coverage, level or duration, always coupled with more activation measures) 
during economic downturns (OECD 2011; Boeri and Jimeno 2016), the nature and scope 
of the reform measures also depend on the respective governmental (Turrini et al. 2015). 
As soon as the effects of economic recession begin easing, measures tightening the 
eligibility and/or reducing generosity become more frequent. However, the first type of 
measure may lead to weaker protection for workers in precarious employment, mainly 
young people and women (Grimshaw et al. 1997). In doing so, states do not ensure due 
protection to the full scope of unemployed people and thus fail in the insurance objective.   
III. Unemployment protection reforms in Southern European countries  
A. Methodological options  
The first methodological option stems from the selection of case studies: Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. A variety of factors determined this choice. Fist, and despite the 




regimes, the four countries are representative of the conservative regime (Arcanjo 2011). 
Second, these southern European countries have from 2004 onwards experienced some 
shared negative developments in terms of their economic and financial frameworks: all 
countries, with the exception of the Italy, recorded very high overall and youth 
unemployment rates, above the EU-28 average (Boeri and Jimeno 2016); Spain (from 
2008 onwards), Greece, Italy and Portugal (since 2001) recorded very high public 
deficits; all of them registered a very unfavourable group in public debt levels (Portugal 
and Spain after 2010). Finally, in varying degrees, they also shared the negative impacts 
arising out of the global crisis of 2008. While both Greece (from 2010 onwards) and 
Portugal (between 2011 and 2014) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Troika (EC, BCE and IMF), serious banking sector difficulties afflicted Italy and Spain 
with both governments ending up requesting external financial assistance (Rubery 2015; 
Pavolini et. al. 2015). 
        The second methodological option relates to choosing the indicators for identifying 
the direction of the unemployment protection reforms carried out over the 2004-2016 
period. The analysis focuses on the legislative changes covering eligibility (main 
conditions and qualifying period) and entitlement/generosity (earning and gross rates in 
UI, the amounts of UA benefits and payment durations) also for the period between 2004 
and 2016. We therefore exclude the benefits and other measures designed to promote 
labour market integration. This made recourse to three sources: the Mutual Information 
System on Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union (MISSOC), the 
LABREF – Labour Market Reforms Database run by the European Commission and the 





B. Unemployment protection in 2004 in the four countries 
Unemployment protection in the European countries is organized according to several 
models. Most countries offer unemployment insurance (UI), which is usually mandatory, 
and unemployment assistance (UA). In the UI, membership is commonly mandatory, in 
keeping with “the contributory principle, which is a means of avoiding adverse selection” 
(Arcanjo 2012: 8). However, in some countries, UA is not available and where social 
welfare may provide a minimum level of income but unrelated to the employment status. 
Furthermore, the specific provisions for UI and UA benefits reveals a great level of 
diversity across European countries (Stănescu 2015; Salgado and Figari 2014; Esser et al. 
2013; Stovicek and Turrini 2012).  
        The four selected countries represent this diversity. In 2004, two countries (Portugal 
and Spain) operated a dual system: with an insurance scheme (with eligibility depending 
on the period of contribution and with earnings-related benefits) and an assistance scheme 
(means-tested and flat-rate benefits). In both countries, UA is granted either to the 
unemployed who have exhausted their entitlement to UI or to those with a shortfall in 
contributions and in economic need. The two other countries (Greece and Italy) offered 
no unemployment assistance scheme.2  
        Over this period, Italy carried out two reforms (2012 and 2015) to unemployment 
benefits. Firstly, the former Ordinary Unemployment Benefit was replaced by two new 
insurance benefits: Social Insurance for Employment (ASpl) and the Mini-ASpl. In 2015, 
the new Social Insurance Provision for Employment (NASpl) replaced the two previous 
benefits and also introduced an experimental means-tested benefit (ASDI). Both reforms 
aimed at increasing the scope of coverage. 
                                                          




C. The legislatives changes introduced during 2004-2016  
Over the 2004-2016 period, 29 main legislative changes were identified: Greece (2008, 
2011, 2013, and 2014); Italy (2006, 2008, 2012 and 2015); Portugal (2006, 2007, 2010, 
2012 and 2015); and Spain (2006, 2007, and 2012).3 Below, we proceed to analyse the 
changes in the parameters and rules in the four selected countries. 
 
Main conditions: the four UI schemes required similar eligibility conditions for receipt 
of unemployment benefits: involuntary unemployment, registration at the employment 
office, capacity and availability to work, and alongside the obligation to actively seek 
employment. In addition to these conditions, access to the Portuguese and Spanish UA 
schemes depended on a means-test: set at 75% and 80% of the minimum wage, 
respectively.  
Over the period, some important changes need identification. In Spain, the terms of 
searching for a job were tightened (for both schemes) in 2012. The Portuguese UI scheme 
adopted a restrictive definition of suitable or convenient job in 2010: during the first year 
of unemployment, beneficiaries are to accept any job offer provided that the wage (gross) 
equals the amount received in benefit plus 10 per cent. In 2013, the Greek scheme 
introduced a new rule: a limit of 450 days of UI benefits over the previous four calendar 
years; unemployed people would have no access to benefits if they met this total; in 2014, 
this limit was reduced to 400 days.  
The means-tested criteria were tightened for both the UA schemes. First, in 2010 
(Portugal) and then in 2012 (Spain), the concept of income became more comprehensive, 
                                                          
3 Some temporary and/or specific benefits are excluded from our analysis. This is the case with the Spanish 
Unemployment Assistance Program for long-term employed (temporary) workers; in the Italian system, 
three benefits were also excluded: a special benefit paid out to construction workers, the mobility allowance 
paid to industrial workers and a temporary benefit for atypical workers; two special social assistance 





including all sources as well the value of any disposable assets. Second, in 2007, a major 
change was introduced to the Portuguese UA scheme: the benchmark of the national 
minimum wage (403 euros) was substituted by the Social Support Index (397.86 euros, 
both 2007 figures), a total then frozen between 2009 and 2013. These two measures both 
had a negative effect on the amounts paid out in benefits and thus, restricting generosity.  
 
Qualifying period: in 2004, the working requirements for the UI schemes in all four 
countries, were expressed by a minimum record of paid employment (200 days in Greece, 
360 days in Italy and Spain and 540 days in Portugal) alongside a relevant period of work 
(six years in Portugal and two years in the other countries). In order to evaluate the effects 
of these legislative changes, and following Arcanjo (2011) and Clasen et al. (2001), we 
calculated the ratio between the two factors.  Correspondingly ranking the countries as 
follows: Spain (0.17), Greece (0.29), Italy (0.50) and Portugal (0.75). In the same year, 
both UA schemes required different qualifying periods: six months of work during the 
last twelve months (Portugal); three months or six months of employment contributions, 
with or without family responsibilities, respectively (Spain).    
        These criteria, which are also central to unemployment coverage, have changed in 
all UI schemes, with the exception of Spain. In Portugal, the qualifying period became 
less stringent requiring 450 days of work, in 2007, and 360 days of work in 2012; 
consequently, the ratio experienced a successive reduction from 0.625 to 0.50. In the 
Italian system, the changes headed in a similar direction: in the Min-Aspi (2012) the ratio 
dropped to 0.25 (three months during the last twelve months); with the qualifying period 
also becoming less stringent in the case of the NASpl (2015) in requiring only three 





Amounts of benefits: first, we analyse the (gross) rates of insurance benefit replacement 
(Table 1) as well as the earnings reference.  
 
Table 1. Replacement rates (UI) 
 Greece Italy Portugal Spain 





40%. 65%. 70% for the first six 
months (M); afterward 
60%. 
2006  50% for the first 6M, 40% 
for the next 3M, and 30% 
for the 10th M.  
 
  
2008 55% of the Minimum 
Wage. 
60% for the first 6M, 50% 
for the next 2M (all 
persons) and 40% for the 
following 4M (only 
persons aged 50 or over). 
  
  
2012  75% for the first 6M, 60% 
for the next 6M and 45% 
after 12M. 
 
65% for the first 6M; 
afterwards 55%. (a) 
70% for the first 6M; 
afterwards 50%. 
2015  75% for the first 6M; 
afterwards, the rate 




Notes: (a) The amount increases specifically when both spouses (and both persons living in de facto relationships) draw unemployment 
benefit and have dependent children.  
Sources: LABREF; MISSOC. 
 
        In 2004, a rates system was in effect in two countries: in Greece, where the rates 
varied according to the occupational classification, while in the Spanish scheme, the 
length of unemployment provided the determining factor (better for the short-term 
unemployed). Once again, the two Iberian countries were more generous. The generosity 
of the protection measured by the net rate of replacement depends on the income.  In same 
year, unemployment benefits were not subject to taxation in any of these countries while 
only in Spain did UI benefits fall subject to social contributions, which made the net rate 




of Portugal. Portuguese UI benefits were subject to a special and temporary (in 2013 and 
2014) social security surcharge.4 
        Over the period, we may observe three types of change. Firstly, in Italy and in 
Portugal (2012), the fixed scale was abandoned and the income replacement level became 
dependent on the duration of unemployment. Secondly, in all those countries (in Italy 
from 2006 onwards), the rates changes clearly penalized the long-term unemployed and 
older unemployed people.  Finally, in 2008, Greece also adopted a fixed scale which 
became linked to the minimum wage. 
        Concerning the time period for calculating average earnings, the four countries 
displayed great diversity in 2004: three months (Italy), six months (Spain), twelve months 
(Portugal) and 24 months (Greece). Over the period, we identified only one change: in 
Greece, the UI benefit annual amount became linked to changes in the minimum wage 
(hereafter MW) (2008); this measure reduced the level of benefits from the outset and 
later impacted harder following the 22% reduction in the MW salary in 2012 and its 
freezing up to the end of the period studied.  
        In 2004, the level of assistance benefit received (UA) depended on the MW:  75% 
in Spain and up to 80% and 100% (without or with dependents, respectively) in Portugal. 
Two changes took place in Spain: in 2006, the rate rose to 80%; in 2007, the MW was 
replaced by the Multiplier Public Income Index (in this year, these reported values of 
665.70 euros and 499.20 euros, respectively). In the same year, the MW was also replaced 
by the already mentioned IAS. 
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Duration of payments: Table 2 presents the situation in 2004 for the UI scheme as well 
as the changes implemented over the period studied.  
Table 2. Duration of payments (UI) 
 Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
2004 From 5 months (M) 




6 M; 9 M for people aged 
over 50 years 
From 12 M to 30 M, 
according to age 
From 4 M to 24 M, 
according to social 
insurance payments 
2006  7M; 10M for people aged 
over 50 
From 9M to 30M, 





2008  8M; 12M for people aged 
over 50  
 
  
2012  10M; 12M (aged between 
50 and 54); 16M (aged 
over 55) 
From 5M to 18M, 





2015  Equal to half the amount 
of social insurance 
payments during the last 
48M 
From 9M to 30M, 
according to age and 
social insurance 
payments   
 
 
Sources: LABREF; MISSOC. 
 
        In 2004, all the countries operated a variable duration but with different determining 
factors: age (Italy and Portugal); the previous working record (Greece and Spain). In 
terms of the maximum duration, the two Iberian countries were the more generous. In the 
Portuguese scheme, the duration became dependent on both the two factors (2006) while 
in Greece age was replaced by the social insurance payments (2015).  
        Over the period, the duration changed in two countries. In Italy, the duration rose 
successively over the period with the same trend observed in Portugal, with the exception 
of the rules in force between 2012 and 2014, i.e. under the financial assistance program.  
        In 2004, the Spanish UA duration normally stood at six months. In Portugal, 




assistance benefit was granted following the time-expiry UI eligibility. There were no 
changes during the period.  
D. The profile of reforms over the period 
Based on Table 3, we may identify the profile of reforms carried out in the four countries. 
 
Table 3. The direction of changes by country and year  




+R (2013, 2014)  +R (2010) 
UA: +R (2010) 
+R (2012) 




 -R (2012, 2015) -R (2007, 2012)  
Rates -G (2008) +G (2006, 2008, 
2012) 
-G (2015) 






-G (2008, 2011)  UA: -G (2007) UA: -G (2007) 
Duration  +G (2006, 2008, 2012, 
2015) 
-G (2006, 2012) 
+G (2015) 
 
Key: R= Restrictive; G=Generous; more (+); less (-) 
Source: Produced by the author based on LABREF and MISSOC.  
 
 
        Measures designed to tighten and restrict access (the four-year rule) and reduce the 
level of generosity (by changes to the rates as well as adopting the MW as the benefit 
calculation benchmark) were implemented in Greece. Despite the reduction of 
unemployment expenditure potentially having been the key public policy objective, those 
measures worsened both the efficiency and the equity of the UI scheme while also 
minimizing working disincentives. 2008 marked year economic activity deteriorated and 




        Several changes were implemented to the Italian system over this period. Almost all 
of them improved access (by introducing a less stringent qualifying period) and increased 
the generosity (by changes to the rates and the duration). However, the positive changes 
implemented in 2015 were combined with less generosity (by a lower replacement rate 
for people unemployed over six months). Contrary to Greece, however, the Italian public 
authorities took measures to improve the efficiency and equity of the UI scheme despite 
the unfavourable fiscal environment prevailing.  
        Portugal registered the highest number of legislative changes. Eligibility for both 
schemes experienced two contrary effects over two different time periods: conditions 
became more restrictive (2010) against less stringent qualifying periods (between 2007 
and 2012). With the exception of the period between 2012 and 2014, the benefit duration 
was increased. However, the generosity level received a negative impact (2012) due to 
both the reduction in the replacement rate for people unemployed over six months and 
the special contribution. Two measures tightened access (a means-tested condition) and 
lowered the generosity (with the introduction of IAS) of the UA scheme. The increase in 
the unemployment rate in 2006-2007, and consequently in public expenditure, may 
explain the measures taken: more unemployed people protected but over shorter periods 
of time. The fiscal position deteriorated sharply and the unemployment rate surged into 
double digits in 2010 (the year prior to financial assistance), which negatively affected 
the coverage of both schemes. During the financial assistance period, the public 
authorities sought to cover more unemployed people but at the cost of lower levels of 
generosity (level and duration). Thus, while the efficiency rate experienced an 
improvement, the measures impacted negatively on the equity of both schemes.  
        In turn, the Spanish system implemented measures aimed at tightening access to both 




benefits (a reduced rate for those unemployed over six months). Concerning the UA 
scheme, access was tightened (by changing the means-tested criteria) while two measures 
had the opposite impact on their generosity (the rate increase followed by the introduction 
of the Public Income Index). In general, the measures mainly derived from the turndown 
in the economic performance and consequently in the government’s fiscal position and 
negatively affected their efficiency and equity (of both schemes).  
        A first conclusion arises from the direction taken by the reform measures 
implemented in the four countries over the period and their potential effects on efficiency 
and equity. We may identify three different profiles: the Italian reforms improved both 
efficiency and equity; Portugal and Spain returned the opposite profile; in Greece, an 
improvement in efficiency had as its counterbalance a negative impact on equity.  
Another important issue surrounds the time spans which concentrated more measures 
aimed at both restraining access (and coverage) and reducing generosity.5 In Portugal, 
Greece and Spain, the majority of the measures seeking to reduce the unemployment 
expenditure came into effect between 2010 and 2014, that is, during their financial 
assistance programs.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
Four conclusions emerge out of analysis of the reform measures implemented in Southern 
European countries during the period from 2004 to 2016. A first conclusion concerns the 
direction of the reform measures implemented in the four countries over the period and 
their potential effect on efficiency and equity. Three different profiles may be identified: 
the Italian reforms improved both efficiency and equity; Portugal and Spain returned an 
                                                          





opposite profile; while in Greece an improvement in efficiency was offset by a negative 
impact on equity. Hence, the Portuguese and Spanish schemes not only became more 
inefficient in the sense of their greater failing of the objectives of such insurance  schemes 
but were also less effective in terms of redistributing the UI (from employed people to 
unemployed people) and poverty alleviation under the UA framework. 
        A second conclusion relates to the potential disincentives for working. Although 
measures to reduce such adverse effects have been taken in all four countries, we are 
unable to state that this was the only determining factor behind the political options taken. 
Indeed, the economic environment and fiscal positions seem to have been decisive to the 
measures implemented in every country, with the exception of Italy. As already 
mentioned, in the other three countries, the majority of measures aimed at reducing 
expenditure on unemployment were enacted between 2010 and 2014, thus, under 
financial assistance programs.  
        Finally, it is important to link the reforms analysed with the economic cycle. 
Between 2009 and 2013, all the countries experienced strong and prolonged economic 
downturns. However, with the exception of Italy, unemployment protection did not 
improve in the three countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain), which is in line with other 
empirical results, hence, the fiscal position strongly influences both the nature and the 
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